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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1973-1974, the U.S. faced the so-called “Energy Crisis” due to the Arab oil embargo and a 
quadrupling of world crude oil prices by OPEC.  This led the U.S. to use a” Price Control” policy 
in the domestic energy market.  The effects of such policy are explored and well documented.  
However, the responses of OPEC producers to such a policy need further attention.  This paper 
examines the effects of these price controls on OPEC’s extraction path and the relation between 
the harm function and the change in OPEC production.  The results show some evidence that 
OPEC did respond differently to price controls applied by the U.S.  For some periods it cut 
production, while in other periods production levels increased.  The results also show some 
evidence regarding Wirl (2008) that OPEC includes political support as part of its objective 
function when it comes to oil extraction. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
asoline is one of the major fuels consumed in the U.S. and the main product refined from crude oil.  Over 
the last 20 years, changes in crude oil prices have explained 85 percent of the changes in the price of 
gasoline in the U.S.  This indicates that the world price of crude oil is the primary explanatory factor of the 
price of gasoline (Federal Trade Commission, 2005).  When the world price of crude oil rises, U.S. refiners must 
pay higher prices for it.  Facing this higher input cost from crude, refiners then charge more for the gasoline they sell 
at wholesale which forces gas stations to charge consumers more at the pump, since they also face higher input 
costs.   
 
In 1973-1974, the U.S. faced the so-called “Energy Crisis” due to the Arab oil embargo and a quadrupling 
of world crude oil prices by OPEC.  This crisis caused dramatic social, political, and economic changes, and led the 
U.S. to use a “Price Control” policy in the domestic energy market.  Under these price control policies, the U.S. set 
different oil prices to insulate the U.S. economy and market participants from the dramatic increase in foreign oil 
prices. 
 
A large literature has looked at the welfare losses of price controls in energy markets.  Agarwal and Deacon 
(1985) looked at the petroleum industry price and allocation controls in the U.S. during the I970’s, and they found 
that regulations consistently kept price below marginal cost, causing the overall volume of refined product output to 
be excessive and this led  to inefficient distribution of the product to consumers.  Camm (1983) discussed the 
impacts of the price control policy on gasoline customers.  He shows that customers were paying higher prices than 
the regulated prices due to the long time wait and cost of wasted time.  Frech and Lee (1987) showed how to ration a 
good across markets (rationing-by-queuing.), while doing the least harm to consumer welfare.  They provide 
empirical estimates from U.  S. gasoline crises of 1973-1974 and 1979 of the extra welfare losses caused by 
misallocation of gasoline between urban and rural markets.  Smith and Phelps (1978) looked at the impact of price 
controls on U.S. domestic oil production.  They showed that price controls during 1974-76 have generated a 
perverse supply curve such that future increases in real world oil prices will transfer proportionately more U. S. 
income to OPEC than past price increases.  Kalt (1981) showed that price controls have an ambiguous effect on total 
domestic output.  This is due to the fact that price controls can either raise or lower the value of current rents relative 
to the value of future rents, causing the time path of extraction from existing reserves to be ambiguous.  Also price 
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controls reduce the absolute present value of the streams of rents going to producers, resulting in reduction in 
exploration and development of new reserves.  Kalt found that price controls caused a deadweight loss to the U.S. 
economy ranging from $1-5 billion yearly.   
 
On the whole, the effects of price controls on crude oil producers and refiners in the U.S. have been 
explored and well documented (Kalt, 1981).  However, the responses of OPEC producers to such a policy need 
further attention.  This paper tests empirically the effect of the U.S. price control policies on OPEC’s decisions, and 
explores if OPEC’s behavior was affected by these policies, particularly the oil extraction decisions of OPEC.  This 
paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief description of the history of oil price control policies in the 
U.S.  Section III examines the effects of these price controls on OPEC.  Section IV reports the findings of the 
relation between the harm function and the change in OPEC’s production, and finally, Section V concludes. 
 
II.  THE HISTORY OF OIL PRICE CONTROL POLICIES IN THE U.S. 1971-1988 (1) 
 
As summarized by Kalt (1981), there is an academic consensus regarding price controls and regulations 
imposed on refined products and crude oil, and their significant negative effects on oil producers and consumers 
alike. In this section I document the history of the US oil price controls. 
 
II.1  Oil Price Controls: 1971-1973 
 
In 1970, President Nixon utilized the broad powers given to him by the congress to launch America’s grand 
experiment with price controls, which then gave way to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.  The President’s 
price control regime consisted of four phases. 
 
Phase I of the experiment applied to wages and prices throughout the economy, and lasted from August to 
November 1971.  Due to the stabilized nature of oil prices during this period, Phase I had minimal effect on oil 
markets. 
 
Phase II of the experiment was more liberal in nature and lasted from November 1971 to January 1973.  
Under this phase all firms excluding the oil and gas sectors were allowed to increase prices above the designated 
price ceiling of Phase I of the experiment, in order to reflect the increase in production cost. 
 
During Phase II the gasoline, heating oil, residual fuel and crude oil prices were locked at Phase I levels.  
This inflexibility resulted in heating oil shortages during the winter of 1972-1973.  However, due to soft global 
prices, the other industry products remained unaffected by the price control. 
 
Phase III of the experiment lasted from January 1973 to August 1973.  During this Phase conforming to the 
Phase II price control became voluntary.  However, extenuating circumstances such as increased heating oil prices 
and political pressure compelled the Nixon Administration to issue “Special Rule No. 1, in March 1973.  The 
Special Rule reinstated strict price controls on the 23 largest domestic oil companies that accounted for about 95 
percent of the industry’s gross sales.  However, the smaller oil companies were not subject to such price control.  
The lack of controls on the smaller firms’ prices resulted in a failure to control market-clearing prices.  In the spring 
of 1973 the market-clearing prices were rising amid the increase in world prices and dollar devaluation. 
 
 Phase III price controls and Special Rule No. 1 affected the market in significant ways, due to the fact that 
23 large oil companies were the major suppliers to the independent gasoline stations at the time.  The strict price 
controls imposed on the big companies and the provisions in Phase III which prevented the aforementioned 
companies from recovering the rising price of crude imports, if they were refined into products, resulted in a 
reduction of the large companies’ crude imports and their sale of refined products to others.  Consequently, the 
independent marketers, distributors, and bulk consumers faced shortages in acquiring fuel for their customers.  Such 
shortages in the market created political demands for sharing the shortages equally.  These pressures resulted in a set 
of Phase IV price controls for the petroleum industry.  In November of 1973, the Phase IV price control regulations 
were placed in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA). 
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II.2  The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) of 1973 
 
The EPAA was adopted to address the independent gas stations’ displeasure about being cut off from the 
major oil companies’ product supplies as a result of restrictions imposed on the latter by Special Rule No. 1 and 
Phase III.  As such, the EPPA placed a halt on buyer-seller relations that existed in 1972, and required a federal 
approval for major changes in buyer-seller relationships, involving regulators in the daily operations of the industry.  
 
Furthermore, the EPAA endorsed a two-tier system of price control on domestic oil. Under the two-tier 
system, the oil that was discovered previously was dubbed as “old oil” and was subject to strict price control (2).  On 
the other hand “new oil” was not subject to price control (3).  In addition, the oil wells that produced less than 10 
barrels of oil per day became exempt from the price control regime in November 1973. 
 
The EPAA produced an allocation problem.  The problem occurred because there was no price control on 
imported crude necessary to meet the domestic demand; however, domestic old oil was subject to strict price 
control.  Therefore, the cost of imported oil was a determining factor in the marginal cost for gasoline sold in the 
United States.  As such, the refiners that had access to old oil profited much more from gasoline sales than those 
refiners who relied on imported crude. 
 
To remedy this allocation problem, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) espoused an “old oil 
entitlement” for individual refineries on a month to month basis.  The purpose of entitlements was to equate each 
refinery’s access to “old oil” to the national average in refinery access to “old oil”.  As such, those refineries that 
made use of old oil in their operations more than the national average access to old oil were forced to buy 
entitlements from those refineries that used less old oil than the national average. 
 
An old oil entitlement program resulted in an increase in crude imports.  The reason for the increase was 
because, by importing more crude, the refineries were able to reduce their dependence on “old oil” and were 
subsequently entitled to receive subsidies from other refineries. The incentive to increase imports continued until the 
value of entitlement tickets equaled the value of the rents created by the price controls (the difference between the 
world price for oil and controlled prices times the volume of old oil). 
 
Although, the purpose of the entitlements program was to balance and make equal the profits across 
refineries, later interventions ultimately favored and benefited some refineries over others. The “Small Refiner Bias” 
regulation, which gave small refineries extra entitlements to old oil, was an example of preferential treatment for 
some refineries at the expense of others.  There were also various other exemptions and responses to appeals given 
by regulators as “hardship relief” under the FEA. 
 
II.3  The Energy Policy & Conservation Act of 1975 
 
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) was an amendment to the EPAA which took effect in 
February 1976.  EPCA expanded price controls to cover the “new oil” products from domestic fields that came 
about after the creation of EPAA.  As a result, a new three-tier price control system emerged and replaced the 
previous two-tier control system.  The new system introduced a binding average price for domestic oil of $7.66 per 
barrel.  This figure was then allowed to be increased up to 10 percent annually to account for various incentive 
payments and inflation (4).  The EPCA was amended in September 1976.  The new amendment allowed the average 
domestic prices to rise 10 percent annually regardless of the inflation rate and regulatory incentives adjustments.  In 
addition, the EPCA removed price controls for major refined oil products except for propane, jet fuel, and gasoline. 
 
The new three-tier regulatory system involved changes in the entitlements program for “old oil”.  Changes 
were required because the “old oil” was now segmented into two categories of lower tier “old oil” which was less 
expensive, and the upper-tier “old oil” which was more expensive.  As such, each barrel of upper-tier oil was given a 
portion of the entitlement granted to lower tier oil. 
 
The old oil entitlement program continued its granting of special exemptions.  In April 1976, the residual 
imports to the East Coast became eligible for partial entitlements.  In addition, in February and March of 1977 
middle distillates were given partial entitlements as a response to the severe winter of that year. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2012 Volume 28, Number 3 
350 © 2012 The Clute Institute 
Fortunately, the EPCA gave the President the authority to halt the petroleum price controls after May 1979.  
As a result the Carter administration made energetic use of this authority and decontrolled the jet fuel prices 
immediately thereafter.  In addition, in June 1979, the Administration removed price controls from oil properties not 
producing in 1978, in addition to the offshore properties leased after December 1978.  Furthermore, 80 percent of 
the production from the marginal lower-tier properties was decontrolled in June 1979. 
 
Subsequently, the producers were allowed to redefine how much oil would be allocated between lower and 
higher tier categories (5).  As such, the heavy crude oil was decontrolled on August 17, 1979.  In addition, in 
January 1980, 4.6 percent of a property’s upper-tier outputs were decontrolled each month.  Then to offset the 
expenses associated with newly-undertaken tertiary recovery projects, smaller amounts of lower tier oil were 
decontrolled. 
 
In summary, President Carter dismantled the price control system to a large extent through administrative 
action.  President Ronald Reagan, in turn, abolished all remaining controls in January 1981 as his first official acts 
as President.  The EPCA formally expired in September 1981, as the Congress did not make an effort to reauthorize 
the program.  
 
II.4  The Windfall Profit Tax: 1980-1988 
 
To replace the EPAA/EPCA, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax (WPT) was enacted in April 1980.  The 
name of this tax was a bit misleading, as this was not a tax on profits, but rather an excise tax on domestic oil 
production, effective March 1, 1980.  These taxes were paid before the oil sales profits were determined.  As such, 
profits had no effect on how much windfall profit tax was paid.  However, producers were able to deduct the 
aforementioned taxes from income tax liabilities as it was considered a cost of doing business. 
 
The excise taxes were enforced based on the difference between the market price for oil and a set “base 
price” which was adjusted quarterly to account for inflation and state severance taxes.  The taxes were generally 
applied at the point of first sale to a refiner.  The rates were: 
 
 Tier One oil, which included most domestic oil in reservoirs that were productive before 1979 got 70 
percent.  In addition, the law established a base price for Tier One oil equal to the upper-tier base price 
established under the EPCA on May 1979, adjusted for inflation. 
 The stripper oil and oil from the Naval Petroleum Reserve, received 60 percent.  The Law designated a 
base price for Tier Two oil equal to the Tier One price plus $1.  The stripper oil was completely exempted 
from the tax. 
 Tier Three oil, which included output from the posts that were newly producing post-1978 properties, 
heavy crude oil, and incremental oil from tertiary recovery, received 30 percent. The law designated a base 
price for Tier Three oil equal to the upper-tier ceiling under the EPCA on May 1979, plus $2.  However, 
the tax on newly discovered oil was reduced gradually, to 22.5 percent. 
 The independent producers who made sales less than $1.25 million quarterly or with less than 50,000 
barrels of production per day were taxed on the first 1000 barrels of oil per day.   Moreover, they paid 
reduced taxes on that oil; 50 percent for Tier One oil and 30 percent for Tier Two oil.  Such independents 
only paid 30 percent on Tier Three oil with an exemption for the first 1,000 barrels per day. 
 The oil produced by state or local governments, educational or charitable medical institutions, Indian tribes 
or individual Indians over which the U.S exercised trust responsibilities, oil produced in much of Alaska 
and the first increments of tertiary oil all received tax exemptions. 
 
Finally, the Windfall Profit Tax was scheduled to expire over 33 months, after January 1988, or the first month after 
the revenues from the tax have equaled $227.3 billion, but no later than January 1991. 
 
III.  THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. PRICE CONTROLS ON OPEC 
 
The major issue in this section is to examine how OPEC responded to the price controls adopted by the 
U.S.  In other words, did OPEC cut production during the time periods in which the U.S. adopted the price control 
policies, or these policies had no effect at all on OPEC’s oil extraction decisions?   
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OPEC’s oil production and reserves are the levels reported by OPEC in its Annual Statistical Bulletin for 
different years (1989-2007).  OPEC‘s Annual Statistical Bulletin provides data about world energy markets.  It 
contains statistical data regarding the oil and gas activities of OPEC‘s member countries (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela), as 
well as the global petroleum industry in general.  It also provides comprehensive and detailed data on upstream and 
downstream activities, and the global flows of oil and gas, in addition to basic financial data about some of the 
world‘s largest oil and gas companies.  Crude oil production and exports for OPEC Members from 1970 – 2007 are 
in 1,000 b/day.   
 
To explore the response of OPEC to the U.S. price controls, we start by detrending the secular production 
levels of OPEC.  This is done by regressing OPEC’s production levels from 1960 to 2007 on a time index, ranging 
from linear up to a sixth order polynomial.  Then, by calculating the Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC), the best 
detrending model will be identified as the one with the minimum SIC (8).  Using this criterion, the secular 
production trend was best captured by a sixth order polynomial trend.  
 
The residuals from this trend capture the effects of the unobservable factors on production levels such as 
cost, expectations and more, including the response of OPEC to the price control policies.  Now, one can argue that 
these residuals may be used to show and test the impact of the price control policies on OPEC’s production.  The 
residuals from this trend are displayed in Figure 1.  The plotted residuals show some evidence that the production 
levels were lower in years 1975, 1976, 1979, 1981-1986, and 1988, when compared to years before and after.  This 
is how one can attribute the negative deviations from the secular trend for these years.  Now, do these reductions in 
OPEC production reflect responses to the price controls or not?  To test what we observe from the plotted residuals, 
a relationship between these residuals and the price control periods should be estimated.  This means we need to 
regress these residuals on the price control periods.  To be able to do so, one needs to include five dummy variables 
for these periods, where each equals one if it is the year or years in which the specific price control was applied, and 
zero otherwise (e.g. for the period 1970, D1 = 1 for this year, and zero otherwise.  For the period 1971-1972, D2 = 1 
for this period, and zero otherwise). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average Residuals Plot 
 
 
Following these notions, our model regresses the residuals, plotted in Figure 1, on five dummies matching 
the periods when price controls were applied, and OPEC’s reserves in year (t), with a constant. 
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Residt = α0 + α1 Rt + α2 D2 + α3 D3 + α4 D4 + α5 D5 + α6 D6   (1) 
 
where, Residt is the residuals from the regression of the production levels from 1960 to 2007 on a time index, Rt is 
OPEC’s reserves in year (t), D1 is a dummy variable for the period 1970 (the base and is dropped), D2 is a dummy 
variable for the period 1971-1972, D3 is a dummy variable for the period 1973, D4 is a dummy variable for the 
period 1974-1975, D5 is a dummy variable for the period 1976-1979, and D6 is a dummy variable for the period 
1980-1988.  The results are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Regression of Residuals on OPEC Reserves and Price Control Dummies 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t - values 
    
OPEC’s reserves 0.0007 0.001 0.49 
    
Dummy for  1971-1972 -1539.34*** 600.76 -2.56 
    
Dummy for  1973 2097.37*** 582.46 3.97 
    
Dummy for  1974-1975 -85.21 1371.69 -0.06 
    
Dummy for  1976-1979 3736.75*** 804.84 4.64 
    
Dummy for  1980-1988 -1856.53** 865.51 -2.15 
    
Constant -343.42 1066.62 -0.32 
    
R-squared      0.39   
Number of observations 48   
-The dependent variable is the residuals of regressing the production levels from 1960 to 2007 on a time index.  The table reports 
the coefficients of the regression of these residuals on the five dummies and OPEC’s reserves, with a constant. 
- Year 1970 is the base. 
-Robust standard errors and t-values are reported in the table. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
In Table 1, the difference between the coefficients of any two consecutive dummies can be interpreted as 
the difference between the levels of production, on average.  The reported coefficients show some evidence that the 
production levels of OPEC were affected by the price controls policies for some periods.   
 
For the period 1971-1972, the average loss in production amounts to approximately 1196 (1000 barrel/day) 
with respect to the previous period in which price controls were used, and 3637 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the 
following period, and both differences are statistically significant (different from zero).   
 
For 1973, OPEC increased production, according to the estimated coefficients.  The average increase in 
production amounts to approximately 3637 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the previous period, and to 2183 (1000 
barrel/day) with respect to the following period, and both differences are statistically significant (different from 
zero).  This result seems odd, given that 1973 is the year in which Arab members of OPEC banned exports to 
western countries and the U.S. due to the 1973 war.  One explanation for this could be that the war did not occur 
until October of that year.  So perhaps these countries, in earlier parts of 1973, were planning for the war and 
increasing oil output to support such activities.  This might have led them to expand extraction at the beginning of 
1973, and perhaps that’s what the coefficient is capturing. 
 
This argument can be supported by the estimates on the 1974-1975 periods, when production is lower than 
in the previous or following time periods.  The Arab members of OPEC were perhaps still using the ban, and were 
also responding to the U.S. price control policies.  The average loss in production amounts to approximately 2183 
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(1000 barrel/day) with respect to the previous period, and to 3822 (1000 barrel/day) with respect to the following 
period.  Both differences are statistically significant (different from zero).  OPEC’s production levels increased for 
1976-1979, and were not affected by the U.S. price control policies.  This indicates that OPEC members were trying 
to recover their foregone revenues to address growth needs inside their countries.  Finally, the estimated coefficients 
show some evidence that OPEC responded by cutting production when the U.S. implemented the “Windfall Profit 
Tax”, from 1980-1988.  OPEC cut production by 5593 (1000 barrel/day) on average, and this difference is 
statistically significant.  This result is supported by the work of Karp and Newbery (1991), where they found that 
OPEC will initially have a lower share of current production than of current reserves when the U.S. and other large 
importers all impose optimal import tariffs.  However, through this period (1980-1988), oil prices were decreasing 
(see Figure 2 in the appendix) and these cuts could have been made by OPEC to help prices increase, rather than the 
decline is a response to the Windfall Profit Tax. 
 
This section shows some evidence that OPEC did respond differently to price controls applied by the U.S.  
For some periods it cut production, while in other periods production levels increased.  Although, these increases or 
decreases are not related only to the price control policies, it still explains some of the variation in production levels. 
 
IV.  RELATION BETWEEN HARM FUNCTION AND RESIDUALS 
 
OPEC includes Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Venezuela.  Following the approach suggested by Wirl (2008), these countries can be divided into 
allies and adversaries, in terms of their relations with the West.  Countries like Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates are seen as allies to the European countries and the U.S.  Countries like 
Iran, Algeria and Venezuela are considered to be anti-West (until 2003, Iraq and Libya considered to be in this 
group).  Following Wirl (2008), the hypothesis in this paper is that OPEC countries do not pursue strict profit 
maximization.  Indeed, they also seek political support among their people.  These countries realize that the Wes 
depends on OPEC’s oil; this gives them some power of influence.  The people of these countries frequently express 
anti-Western sentiments (9).  For this reason, OPEC countries in need of popular domestic support may take 
production decisions to gain such support.  The statements and interviews that we read and watch for Ahmadi Nejad 
of Iran and Chavez of Venezuela are good examples of these policies.  Even countries considered to be allies must 
still secure the support of their people, some of whom also have anti-Western sentiments.  Such countries (allies) 
may adopt a moderate anti-Western policy.  With the political consideration in mind, OPEC countries will be 
assumed to maximize the net present value of benefits, where benefits are derived from oil profits as well as political 
support, based on the degree to which the west is harmed.  
 
Following Wirl (2008), let the political support among citizens of the country be St.  Political support is a 
function of the adverse effect on the West of higher oil prices, so St is the harm function (10).  This harm function 
depends on the quantity of oil extracted and supplied to the market, and on an indicator, α t, that measures the desire 
of OPEC to harm the West.  
 
The harm function can be written as: St = f (qt , αt )  (2) 
 
OPEC is able to harm the western countries and the U.S. by cutting production and raising the price.  Recall that 
OPEC has direct control over quantity not price, as the latter is determined in the market.   
 
The political support (St) will increase as (qt) is cut or if the desire to harm (αt) is stronger.  This means:  
 
∂St /∂qt < 0  (3) 
 
∂St /∂ αt > 0  (4) 
 
Using these notions, a simple form of the harm function with appropriate properties is: 
 
St = αt / (1 + qt) (5) 
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Equation (5) implies that the harm decreases when OPEC increases quantities (one in the denominator 
avoids the case of infinity when quantity is zero).  Also the harm increases with a higher desire to harm, αt.  If OPEC 
has no desire to harm anyone, then αt = zero and the harm function vanishes, meaning that OPEC just maximizes 
profits like any other producer in any market with no other considerations in mind. 
 
Since one of the factors that might affect the secular trend for OPEC’s production levels is this desire to 
harm the west, we can obtain an estimate of αt by estimating the relationship: 
 
Residt = α0 + α1 {1/ (1 + qt)}  (6) 
 
and taking the estimate of α1 as a measure of αt.  This relationship also explores the relation between the residuals 
and the harm function.  The idea is that the harm function might have affected OPEC’s decisions regarding oil 
extraction.  If this is the case, then one should expect to find a relation between these residuals and the harm 
function.  The estimates of the regression are reported in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Regression of Residuals on Harm Function 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t - values 
1/ (1 + qt) - 2.37 e+07 1.78e+07 -1.33 
    
Constant 1146.75 863.31 1.33 
    
R-squared      0.04   
Number of observations 48   
-The dependent variable is the residuals of regressing the production levels from 1960 to 2007 on a time index.  The table reports 
the coefficients of the regression of these residuals on the harm function, with a constant.  Robust standard errors and t-values are 
reported in the table. 
 
 
The results show that the coefficient for the harm function is negative and a large number, although it is not 
significant.  This is consistent with the results found in Kisswani (2009), where the net present value of profits 
increases with a large value of the harm indicator, αt.  The regression outcome here also provides some evidence that 
OPEC considers the harm function when it comes to oil extraction.  This part provides some evidence that OPEC 
members did consider the support of their citizens in deciding on production levels, and this support, which is 
represented by the harm function, needed OPEC to cut production as a response to the U.S. price controls. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The arguents in this paper provide some evidence that OPEC did respond to the price controls applied by 
the U.S., but not in a uniform way.  For some periods it cut production, while in other periods production levels 
increased.  Since this is the case, the U.S. may consider different policies to address high oil prices, especially since 
price control policies also have adverse effects on welfare.  Also the analysis gives some support to the idea that 
OPEC members consider the support of their citizens when deciding on production levels.  However, most of those 
citizens are to be Anti-Western.  Therefore, the U.S. and the West should review their policy in the region to 
improve relations with OPEC’s governments.  Beside they need to communicate better with the people of OPEC 
countries, since they are the main drivers of the harm function that results in restrictions on oil output and higher 
market prices. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. This section draws upon Kalt (1981), Taylor and Van Doren (2006). 
2. The means by which the law defined “old oil” was quite complicated. Output from a domestic property in each 
month of 1972 was defined at that property’s base period control level (BPCL) for that month. If a property had 
once produced more than its BPCL, the amount by which production in any subsequent month fell short of the 
BPCL was added into a property’s current cumulative deficiency (CCD). Output in any month less than or equal to 
the sum of the BPCL and the CCD was defined as “old oil.” 
3. Output greater than the sum of a property’s BPCL and CCD, or from properties not producing in 1972, was 
defined as “new oil.” Each barrel of “new” domestic oil brought to market allowed a producer to release a barrel 
from its “old oil” classification. 
4. Under the Energy Policy & Conservation Act, the BPCL for a property in any month was defined as the lesser of 
the average monthly output of “old oil” in 1975 and the average monthly output of all oil in 1972. “Lower-Tier” oil 
was defined as output not in excess of that property’s BPCL plus CCD. “Upper-Tier” oil was defined as production 
from pre-1976 properties in excess of the associated lower-tier output and production from properties that began 
producing after 1975. Lower-Tier oil sold at its May 15, 1973 price plus inflation and incentive adjustment factors 
determined by the U.S. Department of Energy. Upper-Tier oil sold at its September 30, 1975 price less $1.32 plus 
inflation and incentive adjustment factors. Alaskan North Slope crude oil was treated as upper-tier crude for 
regulatory purposes. Crude from the Federal Naval Petroleum Reserves and incremental production from tertiary oil 
recovery projects was not controlled. The oil release program (established as part of the EPAA) under which 
increases in production above base period 1972 levels would not only be free of price controls but also remove an 
equivalent amount of old oil from controls was repealed.  
5. Producers were allowed to redefine the BPCLs of lower-tier properties to the average output in the six months 
ending March 1979 and to establish CCDs at zero. Thereafter, BPCLs were reduced by 1.5 percent a month in 1979 
and 3 percent per month between 1980 and October 1981. 
6. Primary production methods utilize natural gas or water pressure. Secondary recovery methods inject water or 
natural gas into wells to force the oil to the surface. Tertiary methods recover oil by reducing its viscosity (resistance 
to flow) through heating (usually steam injection) and sometimes the use of soap to dissolve the crude in water. 
7. The WPT was a legislative compromise between the Carter Administration, which supported decontrol of oil 
prices, and congressmen who feared that decontrol would lead to steep price increases. Many analysts had long 
argued, however, that a windfall profit tax was a much more efficient and less economically destructive means of 
transferring wealth from major oil producers to politically favored beneficiaries. 
8. The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) has been widely used for model identification in time series and linear 
regression.  SIC is an index used as an aid in choosing between competing models.  It was proposed as a method for 
choosing between different models with different numbers of parameters, in order to determine which is the “best 
fit” to the observed data. 
9. They disagree primarily with the American and European policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
10. Citizens of the Middle East and some Latin Americans believe that the US policy is targeting them, and that it 
ignores the good aspects of their countries. This is why most of them consider themselves to be “Anti West“. 
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